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The ruling, citing to a 1971 Tax Court case, Granan v.
Commissioner,14 stated that, in Granan, the taxpayer borrowed
money from a bank to pay an outstanding note to a hospital that
represented a liability incurred for medical expenses.  A
deduction was allowed in the year the note to the hospital was
paid with the funds borrowed from the bank (and not in
subsequent years when the bank loan was repaid).15
The 1977 ruling noted that, in the facts before the Internal
Revenue Service, there was no borrowing from a bank or other
third party lender.  Moreover, the issuance of a promissory note
represented only X's promise to pay; it was not payment for
purposes of obtaining an income tax deduction.16
Loan from a vendor's subsidiary
The issue is further complicated by the fact that, in at least
one instance, seed is being sold to farmers with the purchase
financed by a lending subsidiary of the seed company.  The
loan is generally set at three percentage points below the prime
rate.  The precise question is whether a deduction can be
claimed by a participating farmer in the year the seed is sold
and the farmer signs an obligation to pay the subsidiary or
whether the deduction is delayed until the loan is actually paid
off.
Returning to Rev. Rul. 77-257,17 the ruling states that where
funds are borrowed from a “third party,” a deduction can be
claimed in the year the funds are loaned by the third party.  The
key issue is whether funds loaned by a wholly-owned
subsidiary at three percentage points under the prime rate are
considered funds loaned by a “third party.”  Considering the
fact that the lender is wholly owned by the vendor and the loans
are at rates well under the market rate of interest, a genuine
question exists whether the subsidiary is a “third party” lender.
Further guidance in the form of a ruling or rulings or litigation
will be needed before the question is fully answered.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law, Ch. 25 (1998); Harl,
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION   -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtors owed over $300,000 in taxes for
1983 through 1990 and the debtors sought to have the taxes
declared dischargeable. The debtors did not file the returns for
the years involved until 1992 when they were audited. During
the tax years involved, the debtors claimed excess exemptions
on W-4 forms. The only taxes paid during these years was the
small amount withheld from their wages. The evidence showed
that the debtors had a lavish lifestyle and sufficient disposable
income to pay the taxes owed.  The court held that the evidence
demonstrated that the debtors willfully attempted to evade
payment of the taxes; therefore, the taxes were
nondischargeable. In re Thorngren, 227 B.R. 139 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1998).
The debtor had filed three previous bankruptcy cases, with
each case containing an IRS claim for 1992 taxes. At the filing
of the third case, the IRS had two years and 264 days in which
the automatic stay did not prevent collection of the 1992 taxes.
However, by the time of the filing of the current case, the IRS
had more than three years to collect the taxes, excluding all the
periods of the automatic stay for the three previous cases. The
court held that the filing of a bankruptcy case tolled the running
of the three-year period of Section 523(a)(1)(A); however,
because the 1992 claim had been available for collection over
three years by the time of the current case, the 1992 tax claim
was no longer entitled to priority treatment and could be
discharged in the current case. In re Avila, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,274 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999).
The debtor had failed to file and pay income taxes for several
years. The IRS filed assessments for the taxes and then the
debtor filed returns for the years involved using the IRS
assessments as the amount of tax due. The debtor sought to
have the taxes declared dischargeable under Section
523(a)(1)(B) as taxes for which returns were filed more than
three years before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The
court held that the late filed returns were not returns for
purposes of Section 523(a)(1)(B) because the returns had no tax
purpose. In re Mickens, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,265
(6th Cir. 1999), aff’g, 97-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,784
(D. Ohio 1997).
ESTATE PROPERTY . Prior to the debtor’s filing for
Chapter 13, the IRS served a notice of levy on an employer of
the debtor. The levied amount was paid by the employer and
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the lien released before the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The
debtor sought to recover the levied funds, arguing that the
debtor still had an interest in the funds. the court held that once
the levied funds were paid, the debtor not longer had sufficient
interest in the funds to include the funds in the bankruptcy
estate. In re Coghlan, 227 B.R. 304 (D. Ariz. 1998).
CORPORATIONS
DISSENTERS’ RIGHTS. The parties were shareholders in
the defendant close family ranch corporation. The corporation
was formed by the parents of the parties as an estate planning
device. The plaintiffs were off-ranch minority shareholders and
siblings of the corporate officers. The ranch was managed by
the on-ranch shareholders with informal corporate meetings
held at family holiday gatherings. The shareholders had
included a shareholder agreement in the corporate bylaws to
control the sale of stock upon the death of a shareholder. The
viability of the ranch was threatened by the loss of grazing
permits and nearby coal mining and the officers decided to
exchange the ranch for one in New Mexico. One of the
plaintiffs stated that she did not want to retain her stock if the
corporation did not own the family ranch. Although the officers
testified that the minority shareholders were notified about the
exchange of properties, no formal notice was given nor were
the shareholders allowed an opportunity to vote on the property
exchange. After the exchange, the minority shareholders sought
the sale of their stock to the corporation. The corporation
offered to purchase the stock at fair market value less a 30
percent minority discount. The plaintiffs filed suit,  alleging
violation of dissenting shareholders’ rights, breach of contract,
and breach of fiduciary duty and seeking an accounting and
appraisal. The corporation argued that the plaintiffs had waived
their dissenters’ rights through the informal discussion of the
exchange and were equitably estopped from asserting the
dissenters’ rights because they failed to object to the sale. The
court held that, because the officers did not give notice of the
proposed exchange and an opportunity for the shareholders to
vote on the transaction, equitable estoppel could not be applied
against the plaintiffs. The corporation argued that the stock was
to be valued under the shareholders’ agreement, but the court
held that the agreement did not apply because the agreement
was limited to the purchase of stock from a deceased
shareholder’s estate. The valuation of the stock had to be in
accordance with the Montana Business Corporation Act, under
the dissenters’ rights provisions. The court held that the MBCA
required the valuation of the stock at fair market value prior to
the opposed transaction and that no discount for minority
interest was to be applied when the minority shareholders assert
dissenters’ rights. Hansen v. 75 Ranch Co., 957 P.2d 32
(Mont. 1998).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BEEF PROMOTION ACT. The plaintiff was a cattle
producer subject to the $1.00 per head assessment authorized
by the Beef Promotion and Research Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2901(a).
The plaintiff argued that the Act was unconstitutional under the
First Am ndment and the equal protection clause and violated
the C mmerce Clause. The court upheld the Act as
constitutional because the Act regulated commercial speech
d interstate commerce and was reasonably adapted to further
a legitimate governmental interest in promoting the beef
industry. Goetz v. Glickman, 149 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998),
aff’g, 920 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Kan. 1996).
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued proposed
amendments to the Onion Crop Insurance Provisions to: (1)
modify stage guarantee percentages, to have a separate
guar ntee for transplanted and direct seeded onions, and to
provide for modification of stage guarantee percentages in the
sp cial provisions; (2) allow optional units by section or section
equivalent or FSA farm serial number, unless otherwise
provided in the Special Provisions; (3) clarify the replant
payment provisions; (4) clarify the amount of production to
count when damaged production is sold after a previous
det mination that the crop was 100 percent damaged; (5) limit
prevented planting coverage to 45 percent of the production
guarantee for timely planted acreage; and (6) change the
termination date for one county in Oregon and one county in
Washington. 64 Fed. Reg. 8015 (Feb. 18, 1999).
FARM LOANS . The debtors had obtained FmHA (now
FSA) farm loans which were secured by dairy cows. The
original security agreement listed 78 cows as collateral out of a
herd of 114 cows. The FmHA did two collateral inspections
and found the herd reduced to 82 head and then reduced to
zero, with both reductions made without prior consent of the
FmHA. The FmHA ordered the debtors to either replace the
missing cows or pay the FmHA for their value. The debtors did
not comply with the order until one year later and made an
application for another loan. The FmHA denied this application
on the basis of the debtors’ lack of good faith because of the
sale of the collateral-cows without prior consent and failure to
comply timely with the collateral replacement order. The court
upheld the loan denial on the basis of the debtors’ lack of good
faith as evidenced by the sale of the collateral-cows without
paying the proceeds to the FmHA or obtaining prior consent for
the sale. Bryant v. Secretary, USDA, 227 B.R. 89 (W.D. Va.
1998).
MEAT INSPECTION . The defendants were convicted of
meat misbranding under the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21
U.S.C. § 601-695. The defendant were cattle producers who
forme  a corporation to market “healthy” beef products made
from cattle raised by the defendants and neighboring cattle
producers. In the beginning, the advertising and product
brochures accurately described the origins and production
methods of the beef sold by the company. However, when
demand outpaced production, the company purchased outside
beef which was commingled with the defendant’s beef. The
mixed beef was sold under the same advertising and labels,
even though the outside beef was not produced under the same
standards as the defendants’ beef. The appellate court upheld
the convictions as amply supported by the evidence of the
defendants’ knowing attempt to sell misbranded meat. United
States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550 (8th Cir. 1998).
NATIONAL FORESTS . The defendant operated a sheep
ranch near National Forest lands and was charged with
allowing the defendant’s sheep to graze on National Forest land
36 Agricultural Law Digest
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without a permit. The defendant sought a ruling from the
magistrate judge as to the level of mens rea required for a
violation of the grazing regulation, 36 C.F.R. § 261.7. The
regulation prohibits “placing or allowing unauthorized
livestock to enter or be in” National Forest land. The magistrate
ruled that no mens rea was needed. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the standard of mens rea was
recklessness as defined under Section 2.02(2)(c) of the Model
Penal Code. United States v. Osguthorpe, 13 F. Supp.2d
1215 (D. Utah 1998).
WAREHOUSES. The defendant had provided a
warehouseman’s bond to a warehouse with a grain storage
contract with the CCC. The United States sought to recover on
the bond for loss of grain by the warehouse. The evidence
demonstrated, and the court found, that the wheat stored in the
warehouse was “out of condition” from infestation of insects
and contamination by animal filth. The wheat was also
damaged by mold. The court held that the warehouse had
breached the storage contract and the defendant was liable on
the bond, except to the extent the warehouse owners were liable
for the damage to the wheat from poor maintenance. United
States v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1420
(D. Kan. 1998).
VACCINES . See cases under Product Liability infra.
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The taxpayer established a
charitable remainder trust. The trust provided that if the trust
recognizes post-contribution capital gain on trust assets, the
trustee had the discretion to allocate some or all of the capital
gains to trust income. The IRS ruled that, under state law,
capital gains were generally allocated to principal. However,
the IRS ruled that if the creating instrument gave the trustee
discretion in crediting a receipt or charging an expenditure to
income or principal or partly to each, no inference that the
trustee has improperly exercised discretion arose because the
trustee has made an allocation contrary to a provision of state
law. Thus, under the terms of the trust's governing instrument
and applicable local law, trust income could include the
appreciation in trust assets that occurred after those assets
where contributed to the trust. The IRS ruled that the
discretionary allocation of post-contribution capital gains did
not prevent the trust from qualifying as a charitable remainder
unitrust under I.R.C. § 664. Ltr. Rul. 9907013, Nov. 19, 1998.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX . The
decedent’s estate included property which passed to skip
persons and property which passed to a QTIP marital trust. The
estate tax return preparer did not make any reverse-QTIP
election, although some GSTT exemption amount remained
after allocation to the property passing to the skip persons. The
surviving spouse hired a new estate tax advisor who advised
that the reverse-QTIP election should have been made. The IRS
granted an extension of time to file the reverse-QTIP election
but ruled that no extension would be granted for changing the
allocation of the GSTT exemption amount which was
automatically allocated to the property passing to the skip
persons. The IRS ruled that only the remaining GSTT would be
allocabl  to the reverse-QTIP property. Ltr. Rul. 9906006,
Oct. 30, 1998.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, had provided in their wills
for testamentary transfers to their children and grandchildren.
One of the children died and a sibling of the child legally
adopted the surviving grandchild. Under state law, the effect of
a final order of adoption was that the relationship of parent and
child was established between the adoptive parents and the
adopted child as if the adopted child had been born to the
adopted parents. The adopted child was deemed the lawful
child of the adoptive parents and was treated as if the child had
been born to the parents for all legal consequences and
incidents of the biological relation of parents and child. The
IRS ruled that the adoption did not affect the status of the
grandchild for GSTT purposes and the deceased parent rule,
I.R.C. § 2651(e)(1), applied to raise the child one generation.
Therefore, the adopted child was not a skip person because the
child was considered to be one generation below the taxpayers.
Ltr. Rul. 9907015, Nov. 20, 1998.
GROSS ESTATE. The decedent had received a bequest
from a predeceased parent. The parent’s will provided for all
administrative expenses and federal estate taxes to be paid from
the residuary estate. The parent’s will bequeathed one half of
the estate to the decedent but required any state inheritance
taxes attributable to that bequest to be paid by the decedent
from the bequest. In calculating the amount of the parent's
bequest to the decedent as reported on the parent’s federal
estate tax return, the executor of parent's estate subtracted
administrative expenses and debts from the parent’s gross
estate and then multiplied the remaining amount by one-half.
The IRS argued that the decedent’s share should have been
determined by subtracting only the debts and then multiplying
the amount by one-half, because the parent’s will required all
administrative expenses to be paid from the residuary estate.
The decedent’s estate argued that, because the will did not want
the decedent’s bequest to be reduced by federal estate taxes, the
administrative costs were to be excluded from the gross estate
before calculating the decedent’s share. The court held that the
will was clear in assigning administrative expenses to the
residuary estate and held that the decedent’s estate included
one-half of the parent’s estate after reduction only for the
parent’s debts. Estate of Fagan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1999-46.
LEGISLATION . Legislation has been introduced in the U.S.
Se ate (1) to repeal the estate and gift taxes outright; (2) to
phase out the estate tax over five years by gradually raising the
unified credit each year until the tax is repealed after the fifth
year; (3) to immediately raise the effective unified credit to $5
million; and (4) to raise the gift tax exemption from $10,000 to
$25,000. S. 75, 76, 77, 78.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
DEPRECIATION . The taxpayer was self-employed in a
business described by the taxpayer as research and
development. The taxpayer had claimed a business loss in
1992, primarily from costs of a vehicle, which were disallowed
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for lack of substantiation. The court found that the vehicle was
used exclusively in the business and the taxpayer did present a
canceled check as evidence of the cost of the vehicle; therefore,
the court allowed depreciation for the vehicle as a business
expense but disallowed a deduction for other claimed expenses.
The appellate court affirmed in an unpublished opinion.
Yecheskel v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-89, aff’d, 99-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,253 (4th Cir. 1999).
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer had
purchased a ranch for the purpose of subdividing the land into
cabin lots. The land was purchased with money borrowed from
a bank. The loan terms provided for payment of the loan by
assigning the installment contracts used to sell the individual
cabin lots. When the bank became insolvent, the FDIC took
over as receiver and refused to continue the loan payment
terms. The FDIC and taxpayer eventually settled for an amount
of money less than the original loan. The IRS argued that the
difference was discharge of indebtedness income to the
taxpayer. The Tax Court found that the method of payment of
the original loan was so indefinite that the true value of the loan
was not determined until the negotiations between the taxpayer
and the FDIC reached a settlement amount. The Tax Court held
that payment of the loan amount by assignment of installment
contracts was too indefinite to establish the fair market value of
the loan prior to the settlement agreement; therefore, the
negotiated payment was correctly treated as the fair market
value of the loan, resulting in no discharge of indebtedness.
The appellate court reversed, holding that, although the loan
payment method created some uncertainty as to the payments
which would be made on the loans, the payment method did
not affect the taxpayer’s liability on the loan, which was
reduced by the settlement, causing recognition of discharge of
indebtedness income. The appellate court also held that the
taxpayer was not entitled to a purchase price reduction by the
amount of discharge of indebtedness income because the
settlement was reached with a lender and not the seller of the
property. Preslar v. Comm’r, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,258 (10th Cir. 1999), rev’g and rem’g, T.C. Memo. 1996-
543.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING . The taxpayer had sold a
property for cash and an installment note and had instructed the
income tax return preparer to report the gain from the sale on
the installment method. However, the preparer did not follow
the instructions and reported all of the gain in the year of sale.
That preparer died and the taxpayer’s new preparer did not see
the first return for two years because of the estate
administration of the first preparer; therefore, the error was not
discovered for two years. The IRS granted the taxpayer
permission to revoke the original election out of installment
method reporting of the gain from the sale of the property. Ltr.
Rul. 9906039, Nov. 10, 1998.
LEGISLATION . Legislation has been introduced in the U.S.
Senate to allow retiring farmers to rollover the proceeds from
the sale of their farms into a tax-deferred retirement account.
Instead of paying a large lump-sum capital gains tax at the
point of sale, the income from the sale of a farm would be
taxed only as it is withdrawn from the retirement account. S.
62.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in February 1999,
the weighted average is 6.19 percent with the permissible range
of 5.57 to 6.50 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible range)
and 5.57 to 6.81 percent (90 to 110 percent permissible range)
for purposes of determining the full funding limitation under
I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 99-11, I.R.B. 1999-__, __.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
February 1999
AnnualSemi-annualQuarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 4.62 4.57 4.54 4.53
110% AFR 5.09 5.03 5.00 4.98
120% AFR 5.56 5.48 5.44 5.42
Mid-term
AFR 4.71 4.66 4.63 4.62
110% AFR 5.20 5.13 5.10 5.08
120% AFR 5.67 5.59 5.55 5.53
Long-term
AFR 5.24 5.17 5.14 5.12
110% AFR 5.77 5.69 5.65 5.62
120% AFR 6.30 6.20 6.15 6.12
March 1999
AnnualSemi-annualQuarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 4.67 4.62 4.59 4.58
110% AFR 5.14 5.08 5.05 5.03
120% AFR 5.62 5.54 5.50 5.48
Mid-term
AFR 4.83 4.77 4.74 4.72
110% AFR 5.32 5.25 5.22 5.19
120% AFR 5.80 5.72 5.68 5.65
Long-term
AFR 5.30 5.23 5.20 5.17
110% AFR 5.83 5.75 5.71 5.68
120% AFR 6.38 6.28 6.23 6.20
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer was a 10
percent shareholder in an S corporation which was a limited
partner in a real estate development partnership. The
corporation had a share of the partnership’s discharge of
indebtedness income in one tax year which was not recognized
because the corporation was insolvent. The taxpayer increased
the basis of the stock by the taxpayer’s share of the discharge of
indebtedness income. The court held that the determination of
discharge of indebtedness income was made at the corporation
level and that the discharge of indebtedness income did not
pass to the taxpayer because the discharge of indebtedness
income as not recognized at the corporation level because of
the insolvency exception. C viser v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1999-47.
TERMINATION. The taxpayers, husband and wife, were the
sole shareholders of an S corporation which had accumulated C
corporation earnings and profits. The taxpayers hired a new tax
accountant  who discovered that the S corporation election had
terminated because the corporation had three years of excess
passive investment income. The IRS ruled that the termination
was inadvertent and allowed the corporation to continue as an S
corporation if for the third tax year involved, the corporation
distributes all of its C corporation earnings and profits to the
taxpayers who report the income on their personal tax returns.
Ltr. Rul. 9906002, Oct. 19, 1998.
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX*
In recent years, numerous firms and individuals have been
promoting plans which involve full-income tax deductibility of
health and accident coverage by an employer, including a sole
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proprietor. The approach suggested is to hire the spouse as an
employee, obtain health and accident coverage for the
employee and deduct the cost as a business expenses. An issue
has arisen as to whether a spouse-partner can be considered an
employee. The Office of the Regional Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration in Kansas City has taken the
position in Internal Memorandum No. 98-01, March 3, 1998,
that
“a true employer/employee relationship can not exist because
there is no way for one partner in the farm to remove the
right of the other partner to make these business decisions.…
The intent to jointly operate a business and the right to
participate in the management of the business are factors
indicating a person is not an employee. Even if one spouse
voluntarily allows the other to make all management
decisions, the right to participate as part owner of the
property still exists. Essentially, one partner can not
discharge the other or remove the other’s right to make
decisions, and therefore, can never meet one of the important
common law control tests.”
As a result of the above position, SSA, at least in the Kansas
City region, is taking the position that a bona fide
employer/employee relationship cannot exist when land is
jointly owned by the spouses. As a result, SSA is maintaining
the position that the wages paid to the employee-spouse are not
to be included in the Social Security benefit calculation for the
employee-spouse and that such persons must amend their tax
returns to remove those wages for purposes of future Social
Security benefits.
It is suggested that legislation be enacted that amends I.R.C. §
105 to provide specifically that the ownership or co-ownership
of land or other assets used in the business by the employee-
spouse does not preclude a genuine employer/employee
relationship provided that the other requirements are satisfied
with respect to the existence of a bona fide employer/employee
relationship.
*Submitted by Roger A. McEowen, Associate Professor of
Agricultural Economics and Extension Specialist, Agricultural
Law and Policy at Kansas State University.
NEGLIGENCE
CROP SPRAYING . The plaintiffs raised fruits and
vegetables on 185 acres. The plaintiffs alleged crop damage
from the spray drift from application of the herbicide dicamba
on neighboring farms. The plaintiff sued the herbicide sprayer
for negligence and the herbicide manufacturer in strict liability.
The only evidence connecting the herbicide spraying and the
crop damage was a plaintiff’s expert’s opinion that the
herbicide caused the damage. The jury returned verdicts for the
plaintiff against all defendants but reduced the damages
assessed against one sprayer by 50 percent for the plaintiff’s
comparative negligence and awarded no damages from the
other sprayer. The trial court entered judgment n.o.v. for the
manufacturer. The appellate court upheld the judgment n.o.v.
against the manufacturer, holding that the expert testimony was
too conclusory and was insufficiently supported by hard
evidence to provide a basis for strict liability of the
manufacturer. The plaintiff also argued that the jury’s failure to
award damages from one sprayer was inconsistent and required
a n w trial on the damage issue. The court noted that the jury
had awarded damages against all other defendants and,
therefore, had contemplated whether this sprayer had caused
any damages, even thought the sprayer was found to have been
negligent in applying the herbicide. The court also noted that
th  jury had made an inquiry of the trial court whether the jury
could find liability and not award damages. The counsel for
both parties had agreed that the jury could find negligence yet
no damages. Kleiss v. Cassida, 696 N.E.2d 1271 (Ill. Ct. App.
1998).
MISREPRESENTATION . A dairy farmer hired the plaintiff
cooperative to “burn down” a failed alfalfa crop and replace the
crop in time for harvest in the same planting season. The
plaintiff consulted with the defendant who recommended the
use of a herbicide manufactured by the defendant and one made
by another company. The herbicides were supposed to be
applied on one day with replanting allowed seven days later.
The old crop was destroyed but the new crop was also
damaged, allegedly by residue of the herbicide produced by the
other company. The plaintiff sued for negligent
misrepresentation, arguing that the defendant was negligent in
recommending replanting in seven days instead of the proper
21 day replanting period. The trial court granted summary
judgment to the defendant, holding that the negligent
misrepresentation claim was barred under the economic loss
doctrine under Iowa law. The plaintiff argued that the economic
loss doctrine did not apply because the claim was that the
defendant provided incorrect advice as to the replanting period.
The court upheld the summary judgment, holding that the case
was actually about the performance of the herbicide product
and not the advice given. The court characterized the problem
as arising from the products’ failure to dissipate within seven
days as it was supposed to do. The court also held that three
elements of the negligent misrepresentation action were not
present: (1) the defendant was not in the business of supplying
information but was a manufacturer of one of the herbicides;
(2) the defendant did not have a pecuniary interest in giving
advice because the other herbicide was sold by the other
company; and (3) the plaintiff could not reasonably rely on the
defendant’s advice about a product not produced by the
defendant. Maynard Co-op. Co. v. Zeneca, Inc., 143 F.3d
1099 (8th Cir. 1998).
NUISANCE
AGRICULTURAL AREA DESIGNATION . The U.S.
Supreme court has denied certiorari in the following case. Iowa
Code Ch. 352 provides for designation of rural property as an
agricultural area. Such a designation excepted the property
from being found to be a nuisance, except in several specified
circumstances. The defendants had applied for designation of
their land as an agricultural area and the county board of
supervisors had approved the designation. The plaintiffs were
neighboring landowners who challenged the constitutionality of
the statute, arguing that the statute constituted a taking of
property by the government without compensation. The court
held that (1) the grant of immunity from a nuisance action was
a grant of an easement over the neighbors’ property, (2) an
easement was a property right for which the government would
have to pay compensation if the easement was forced on a
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property owner, and (3) the granting of immunity from
nuisance suits was a taking of property for which compensation
must be paid in order for the taking to be constitutional. The
court held, therefore, that the statute was “flagrantly”
unconstitutional. Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, No.
192/96-2276, __ N.W.2d __ (Iowa 1998), cert. denied, 1999
U.S. Lexis 1509 (S. Ct. 1999).
CHICKENS . The plaintiffs were neighbors in several
directions to the defendant. The plaintiffs owned their rural
residences prior to the defendant’s purchase of the defendant’s
property. The defendant told the real estate agent that the
defendant planned to use the property to raise and breed
roosters for cockfighting. The evidence showed that the
defendant had from 20 to over 100 roosters on the property and
that the birds crowed from dawn until dusk each day and often
at night if the moon was bright. The court found that the
roosters created more noise than was normal for rural living.
the court also found that the defendant realized no income from
the roosters and held that the raising of so many roosters for no
profit was unreasonable. The court upheld the trial court verdict
that the roosters were a public nuisance and the order that the
defendant keep no more than six roosters on the property at any
one time. Forrester v. Webb, 1999 WL 74543 (Ohio Ct. App.
1999).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
VACCINE . The plaintiffs operated a feedlot and vaccinated
their cattle with a vaccine manufactured by the defendant. The
plaintiffs alleged that the vaccine was defective and failed to
prevent the cattle from contracting disease which caused weight
loss and death in their cattle and cattle owned by others in the
feedlot. The plaintiffs brought actions for breach of implied
warranties of fitness for a particular purpose and
merchantabilty, failure to warn about foreseeable dangers, and
supplying false information to the USDA in application for a
vaccine license. The defendant argued that all of the claims
were preempted by the regulations promulgated under the
Virus-Serum-Toxin Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159. The court held
that the statute contained no specific preemption provision and
that only the regulations attempted to preempt state regulation
of vaccines. The court also held that the regulations have no
provisions specifically preempting state court tort actions.
Instead, the court found that the regulations specifically
prohibit vaccines from disclaiming merchantability, fitness for
the purpose offered or manufacturer responsibility for the
product. The court refused to allow broad preemption by the
regulations where the statute did not contain any preemption
provision and held that the plaintiffs’ causes of action were not
preempted by the regulations or statute. Symens v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 19 F. Supp.2d 1062 (D. S.D. 1997); Sjovall
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 16 F.Supp.2d 1112 (D. S.D.
1997). The Symens case has been reversed on the issue of
whether APHIS can preempt state common law contract and
tort actions through its regulations. The Symens case was
remanded for analysis of the plaintiff’s claims to determine
whether any are expressly preempted by the regulatory scheme.
The court noted that the regulations do not preempt any state
common law actions involving failure to comply with federal
standards. Symens v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 154 F.3d
1050 (8th Cir. 1998).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
ANIMAL FEED . The plaintiff raised swine and used feed
manuf c ured and sold by the defendant. The plaintiff claimed
hat the f ed was defective and sued for violation of the Illinois
Comm rcial Feed Act, 505 ILCS 30/1 et seq. The defendant
moved to dismiss that part of the suit, arguing that the ICFA
provided no private right of action to enforce the act. The court
hel that the ICFA provisions were criminal in nature and did
not expressly or impliedly provide for a private action to
enforce its provisions. Emerald Pork II, Ltd. v. Purina Mills,
Inc., 17 F.Supp2d 816 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
ZONING
EXCLUSIVE FARM USE AREA . The petitioner was an
owner of rural property which was zoned as an exclusive farm
use area. The petitioner sought an exemption to allow the 40
acre parcel to be split into thirds with a residence placed on
each part. The county approved the exemption but the state
Land Use Board of Appeals overturned the exemption, ruling
that the resulting parcels had to each comply with the minimum
lot size of 80 acres each because the parcels were still in an
exclusive farm use area. The petitioner argued that the statutes
providin  for exemptions had no minimum lot size
requirements. The court upheld the LUBA denial of the
exemption, holding that the exclusive farm use statutes were to
be rea  together to require all parcels with a residence to be at
least 80 acres, even if a non-farm dwelling was allowed.
Dorvinen v. Crook County, 957 P.2d 180 (Or. Ct. App.
1998).
NON-AGRICULTURAL USE AREA . The defendant town
adopted an ordinance prohibiting the “raising, keeping,
growing, maintenance, husbandry or quartering of either swine
or fowl within the town limits.” The plaintiff raised emus for
commercial purposes on property within the town limits and
was charged with a violation of the ordinance. The ordinance
did allow an exception for activities for personal use or
consumption. The plaintiffs challenged the ordinance on three
grounds: (1) the town could not prohibit a lawful business
which was not a nuisance, (2) the ordinance was based on an
arbitrary business classification, and (3) the ordinance was
overbroad in prohibiting the raising of all birds. The court
upheld the ordinance as rationally related to the exercise of the
legitimate governmental interest of protecting the health of its
citizens. Phillips v. Town of Oak Grove, 968 S.W.2d 600
(Ark. 1998).
CITATION UPDATES
Estate of Lute v. United States, 19 F.Supp2d 1047 (D. Neb.
1998) (disclaimers) see 9 Ag. Law Dig. 136 (1998).
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The Agricultural Law Press and the Montana Society of CPAs present
“SEMINAR IN THE ROCKIES”
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINAR
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
August 5-7, 1999
Come join us in the clear, wild mountain air of the Montana Rocky Mountains for a world-class seminar on the hottest topics in
agricultural tax and law. Space is limited for this wonderful opportunity to gain expert insight into agricultural law and enjoy the
splendor of one of America’s greatest natural wonder.
The seminar will be Thursday, Friday and Saturday, August 5-7, 1999 at the magnificent Rock Creek Lodge, near Red Lodge
located in the heart of the magnificent Montana Rockies. Registrants may attend one, two or all three days, with separate pricing
for each combination. On Thursday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Friday, Dr. Harl and Roger
McEowen will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Saturday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several
other areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes a copy of Dr. Neil Harl's seminar manuals, Farm I co e Tax (almost
300 pages) and Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials  (nea ly 500 pages) and a copy of Roger McEowen’s
outline, all of which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small
additional charge. Continental buffet breakfasts and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income averaging;
earned income credit; income in respect of decedent.
• Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business  deduction (FOBD),
handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, and
generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities, self-
canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability companies.
• Law developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and environmental law.
Special room discounts are available for all rooms at the Rock Creek Resort. The resort is located 60 miles south of Logan
International Airport in Billings and 60 miles north of Yellowstone Regional Airport in Cody, WY. The Lodge features a variety of
splendid guest accommodations and activities, including horseback riding, golf, rafting, hiking, mountain biking, and fishing.
Yellowstone national park is 60 miles to the south, just over 11,000 ft. Beartooth Pass. Picturesque Red Lodge, MT is only minutes
away.
The seminar registration fees for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles
of Agricultural Law and members of the MSCPAs are $175 (one day), $350 (two days) and $500 (three days).  The registration
fees for nonsubscribers and nonmembers are $195, $380 and $560 respectively.
Call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958 if you would like a brochure. Or e-mail us at aglaw@ao .com
*     *     *     *
Watch this space for information soon about the 4th Annual “Seminar in
Paradise” in January 2000 on the tropical island of Maui!
